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THE NEXT STEP IN DIVERSITY: EXTENDING THE LOGIC
OF GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER TO FACULTY TENURE
PATRICK M. GARRY
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 2003, the United States Supreme Court had decided only
one case involving affirmative action policies in higher education. In
Regents of University of California v. Bakke,' the Court overturned a
medical school's racial set-aside program that reserved 16 out of 100
admission slots for members of certain minority groups. 2 Twenty-five
years later, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger3 upheld the University of
Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions policy. 4 This deci-
sion hinged on the issue of whether diversity constitutes a compelling
interest that can justify the "use of race in selecting applicants for admis-
sion to public universities." 5  Never before had the Court recognized
diversity as a compelling interest that could sustain a challenge brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.6 In making
that recognition, the Court relied heavily on the arguments of law school
faculty and administrators regarding the vital educational benefits de-
rived from classroom diversity.7  Such diversity, the argument main-
tained, was essential for the development and training of society's future
leaders.
8
The Grutter Court accepted without question the arguments press-
ing for student-body diversity to be ruled a compelling interest.9 How-
ever, if a racially diverse student body leads to a "livelier, more spirited"
classroom discussion and a "better understanding" of different races,'
0
logic dictates that a truly diverse faculty would more directly and imme-
diately lead to such an outcome. If an institution of higher education has
a compelling interest in racially diversifying its students, it has an even
t Assistant Professor, Univ. of South Dakota School of Law; J.D., Ph.D. University of
Minnesota.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271.
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The companion case to Grutter, decided at the same time and
involving the admissions policies to the University of Michigan undergraduate program, was Gratz
v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307-10.
5. Id. at 322.
6. Id. at 341.
7. Id. at 308.
8. Not only did minority students have to be admitted so as to create this diversity, but a
"critical mass of underrepresented minority students" was needed. Id. at 319.
9. Id. at 307-08.
10. Id. at 330.
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greater interest in racially diversifying its faculty. The problem, though,
is tenure. A law school's student body turns over every three years; and
every fall an entirely new class of students is admitted. Consequently,
student diversity can be achieved somewhat quickly. But faculty diver-
sity is another matter. Because of tenure, very few openings occur each
year. While new hires may be subjected to affirmative action guidelines,
true diversity will come very slowly, especially if none of the tenured
professors resign or retire.
There is no group in society more committed to affirmative action
and racial diversity than the nation's higher education faculty." At the
same time, under the logic of Grutter, there is no group in society more
vital to the training and education of America's diverse population.
Given this urgent and vital need for diversity, this article asserts that the
arguments made in Grutter for a race-based student admissions policy
extend logically to a university's dismantling of its tenure system so as to
achieve a faculty as equally diverse as its students.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GRUTTER
At issue in Grutter was the University of Michigan Law School's
(Law School) race-conscious admissions policy. 12 Petitioner Grutter, a
white applicant to the Law School who had qualifying test scores and
grade point average, filed suit after she was denied admission, claiming
that the Law School had discriminated against her on the basis of race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.,
3
The Law School admitted that it used a race-conscious admissions policy
to enroll a critical mass of certain minorities, and that this critical mass
was "a number that encourages under represented minority students to
participate in the classroom and not feel isolated."'14  According to the
Law School, only a critical mass could achieve the "educational benefits
11. See infra notes 34 and 36.
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. This policy, implemented as a means of achieving student
diversity, "[affirmed] the Law School's commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclu-
sion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, who otherwise might not be
represented in the student body in meaningful numbers." Id. The policy "requires admissions offi-
cials to look beyond grades and test scores to other criteria that are important to the Law School's
educational objectives." Id. at 315. The policy "seeks to guide admissions officers in producing
classes both diverse and academically outstanding." Id. at 316. What the race-conscious policy
attempted to do was to enroll a "critical mass" of certain minority students. Id.
13. Id. at 316-317. The president of the University of Michigan at the time of the lawsuit's
filing was Lee Bollinger. Id. at 316.
14. Id. at 318. At trial, the Director of Admissions for the law school testified that the race of
applicants must be considered "because a critical mass of underrepresented minority students could
not be enrolled if admissions decisions were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT
scores." Id. The faculty member who chaired the committee that drafted the race-conscious admis-
sions policy testified that the policy aimed at including "students who may bring to the Law School a
perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the victims of such dis-
crimination." Id. at 319.
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of diversity."'15 As Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion for the Court,
Grutter presented an issue of national importance-"[w]hether diversity
is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race
in selecting applicants for admission to public universities.
16
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor recognized that the Law School's
admissions policy "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny."' 7  When strict scrutiny is employed, a race-based action can
survive only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.' 8  Relying upon Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, Justice
O'Connor ruled that "the attainment of a diverse student body" did in-
deed constitute a compelling state interest that justified the use of race in
admissions decisions.' 9 However, Justice O'Connor limited that ruling
to the area of higher education, stating that universities occupy "a special
niche in our constitutional system." 20 When reviewing race-based gov-
ernmental action, even under a strict scrutiny analysis, courts must con-
sider the "context" and all "relevant differences," Justice O'Connor
15. Id. at 319. When such a critical mass is present, "racial stereotypes lose their force be-
cause nonminority students learn there is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints
among minority students." Id. at 320.
16. Id. at 322. This issue had been previously addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that diversity is not a compelling state interest) and by
the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000)
(ruling that diversity is a compelling state interest).
17. Id. at 331. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 326
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). Therefore, any governmental action based on race classifica-
tions must be subject to "detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection
of the laws has not been infringed." Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) (holding that "government may treat people differently because of their race only
for the most compelling reasons")).
18. Id. at 327. While much of the Court's opinion, as well as the dissenting opinions, ad-
dressed the 'narrowly-tailored' requirement, this article will focus on the 'compelling government
interest' requirement of strict scrutiny review.
19. Id. (stating that "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions"). According to
Justice O'Connor's rendition of his opinion, Justice Powell had been careful to state that race was
only one factor among many that a university may properly consider when compiling a diverse
student body. Id. As Justice Powell wrote, the "diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315
(1978).
The Bakke decision produced six separate opinions, none of which produced a majority of
the Court. Id. Justice Powell provided the fifth vote which broke the logjam between the four
Justices who would have upheld the racial set-aside program on the ground that race could be used
to remedy the injuries caused by past racial prejudice. Id. at 325 (joint opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four other
Justices never even reached the constitutional question, but struck down the program for statutory
reasons. Id. at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell's opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court invalidated the set-aside program, yet reversed the state court's injunction
against any use of race whatsoever. Thus, according to O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, the only
holding in Bakke was that a state "has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a
properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
20. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
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wrote.21 Upon such consideration, diversity in the realm of higher educa-
tion becomes a compelling government interest because of the unique
and vital "educational benefits" it provides.22
According to Justice O'Connor's opinion, diversity promotes
"cross-racial understanding," helps students to "better understand per-
sons of different races," and leads to a "more enlightening and interest-
23ing" classroom discussion. Diversity not only prepares students to be
good citizens, but helps train them to be society's future leaders.24 Fur-
thermore, since education "is the very foundation of good citizenship,"
diversity in our colleges and universities demonstrates that "public insti-
tutions are open and available to all segments of American society, in-
,,25cluding people of all races and ethnicities. Thus, higher education,
and particularly the nation's law schools, plays an indispensable role in
conveying "generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship. 2 6 This
is a role that sets higher education apart, in terms of affirmative action
policies, from other social or economic institutions or organizations.
The Court applied the strict scrutiny test the way it did because of
the special nature of higher education. Normally, the use of strict scru-
tiny spells the demise of whatever government action is being chal-
lenged.27 Rarely does the Court apply strict scrutiny, as it did to the Law
21. Id. at 327. According to Justice O'Connor, "[clontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. "Not every decision influenced by
race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision-
maker for the use of race in that particular context." Id. at 328.
22. Id. For this reason, it is doubtful that Gruntter applies to affirmative action programs
outside of the educational area.
23. Id. at 330. According to the Court, the educational benefits of diversity are "important
and laudable." Id. The Court also cited studies which show that student diversity "better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as profession-
als." Id.
24. Id. at 332. Institutions of higher education, and particularly law schools, "represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders." Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 634 (1950) (describing law school as a "proving ground for legal learning and practice")). As
the Court recognized, persons with law degrees occupy more than half of the seats in the U.S. Sen-
ate. Id. The Court also cited Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which stated that the "'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples." Id. at 324, quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. According to
Justice O'Connor, "law schools cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions
with which the law interacts." Id. at 332.
25. Id. at 331-32. "And nowhere is the importance of such openness more acute than in the
context of higher education." Id. at 332. This openness is vital for instilling the confidence of a
heterogeneous society in the integrity of its educational institutions. Id. The Court likened higher
education to the military, in the sense that America's "most selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective." Id. at 331.
26. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
27. The Court has previously held that racial classifications are "presumptively invalid and
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993).
Almost never do government actions survive strict scrutiny. In fact, "when the Court has applied
strict scrutiny to a race-conscious measure designed to assist minorities, it has never upheld the
measure." Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J., 427, 433 (1997). See generally City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to overturn race prefer-
(Vol. 82:1
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School's admissions policy, and still uphold the policy or program at
28
issue. Thus, the only explanation for the Grutter outcome is that in the
field of higher education, diversity provides an extra-compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 29 If this is the case, then diversity should also justify
ences in government contracting). Lower courts have previously used strict scrutiny to invalidate
race-conscious policies in public university admissions. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir. 1996). See also Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (invalidating race prefer-
ences in employee layoff policies). Strict scrutiny, as the highest standard of constitutional review,
has been famously termed by Gerald Gunther as "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther,
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Before 1995, affirmative action programs implemented by the federal government only
needed to pass the intermediate scrutiny test. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65
(1990). But in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, the Court shifted its stance and held that strict
scrutiny applies to all government affirmative action programs. 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding
that "federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
28. According to the dissent, the Court made no serious effort to scrutinize the Law School's
claim that it "has a compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student
body." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
described the Court's approach as "unprecedented deference to the Law School-a deference anti-
thetical to strict scrutiny." Id. at 362. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "[allthough
the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is un-
precedented in its deference." Id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that
the Court, "in a review that is nothing short of perfunctory, accepts the University of Michigan Law
School's assurances that its admissions process meets with constitutional requirements." Id. at 389
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
29. Justice O'Connor suggested that the reason for the unusual deference toward a racial
discriminatory policy lay in the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom and educational
autonomy. Id. at 329 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312) (stating that the "freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body"). However,
educational autonomy is a highly suspect basis for judicial deference on something as important as
racial discrimination. Even with the First Amendment and freedom of speech, the Court has not
given deference to educational institutions. In Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., the Court refused to
let a school censor an anti-war symbol worn by students throughout the school day. 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969). The school argued that, during the height of the Vietnam War, such symbols would
cause disruption within the school. Id. at 510. But even though this was an issue that touched upon
the educational and learning environment of the school, the Court refused to defer. Id. at 514.
Likewise, in Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, the Court declined to defer to a school's decision to
remove some "just plain filthy" books from the school library. 457 U.S. 853, 857 (1982). But this
issue again went to the very heart of the school's educational mission-e.g., the kind of books and
materials to which it was exposing its students. Grutter, on the other hand, involves an issue less
central to the educational function of the school. It does not involve the behavior of students who
are already in a classroom, nor does it involve the kind of books that are filling library bookshelves
and being read by students. Instead, Grutter involves a kind of pre-education decision---e.g., whom
to admit as students. In a sense then, Grutter involves a gate-keeping function, performed prior to
any educational function. Thus, there is less of a need to respect the educational autonomy of the
Law School in this regard. Moreover, the notion of academic freedom and educational autonomy
are justified in part by the courts' acknowledgment that they are not the best judges of such matters.
See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
The courts, with regard to education, have traditionally taken a hands-off approach and
left educational matters to the educators. For instance, in a situation like Tinker, where possible
disruption of the actual school environment is concerned, courts defer and recognize that educators
are in the best position to judge. Similarly, in cases like Pico, where the choice of learning and
textual materials is concerned, the courts consider that educators are in a better position to judge.
But in Grutter, which entails a race-based admissions policy, the courts are actually in a better
position to judge, and hence should be less likely to defer. Perhaps the courts cannot adequately
determine the effect of sexual innuendo on children (as in Bethel) or the role and standards of a
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other governmental actions that would not otherwise be permissible in
any other area.
The fact that the Law School's admissions policy survived strict
scrutiny-a feat that almost no other state interest ever accomplishes-
means that diversity in the educational arena is an interest that surpasses
all other government interests. Furthermore, it means that racial diver-
sity constitutes a subject matter that the courts will treat differently than
any other area of constitutional protection. For instance, a program that
restricts the speech rights of a particular group of people will almost
automatically be struck down, but a program that infringes on the equal
protection rights of a particular racial group may survive if the purpose is
to create racial diversity. Because of this apparently unique mixture of
diversity, education and race, it is asserted below that the same argu-
ments presented in Grutter can also justify governmental encroachment
on the property rights of tenured faculty.
III. THE EXTENSION OF GRUTTER TO FACULTY DIVERSITY
The argument used by the University of Michigan for the achieve-
ment of a critical mass of underrepresented minorities was that without
such numbers, minority students would feel isolated and pressured to act
like spokespersons for their race. According to the Law School, only a
critical mass of minority students would provide a meaningful opportu-
nity for all students to reexamine racial stereotypes and produce the edu-
cational benefits that diversity has to offer.31 However, as the dissent
pointed out, it is the educational benefits that are the real goal or compel-
ling interest behind the Law School's race-based admissions policy.
32
school newspaper (as in Hazelwood), but courts are definitely in a position to adequately judge the
constitutionality of race-based actions.
The Court's decision in United States v. Virginia also indicates that Grutter cannot be
explained on the basis of educational autonomy or academic freedom. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). In
Virginia, the Court found an equal protection violation in a state military college's exclusion of
women. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545-46. This finding occurred even though the college argued that
"single-sex education provides important educational benefits," as well as "character development
and leadership training." Id. at 535. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that several amici urged
that "single-sex schools can contribute importantly to [educational] diversity." Id. at 534 n.7. Yet
despite these educational-benefits arguments, and despite the fact that the Court evaluated the case
under a lower level of scrutiny than that used in Grutter, the Court did not recognize educational
autonomy and defer to the judgment of the school. Id. at 533, 555 (stating that the test used for
evaluating gender-based classifications is "whether the proffered justification is exceedingly persua-
sive," and that such classifications warrant "heightened scrutiny"). See also Jeffrey A. Barnes, The
Supreme Court's "Exceedingly [Unlpersuasive" Application of Intermediate Scrutiny in United
States v. Virginia, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 523, 523 (1997) (noting that the Court in Virginia applied a
"form of intermediate scrutiny").
30. See Respondent's Brief at 26, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
31. As the Court's opinion stated, "diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial
part of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of
minority students." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. The Court accepted without question the Law
School's conclusion, based on its experience, "that a critical mass of under represented minorities is
necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student
body." Id.
32. Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Diversity, in effect, is only the means to the end.33 If diversity produced
no educational benefits, then diversity would not be a compelling interest
of an institution of higher education. But when educational benefits are
recognized as the real goal, then student diversity must be recognized as
the second-best way of reaching that goal. Since faculty are the leaders
of the educational environment in universities and law schools and,
hence, are in the best position to produce educational benefits, then it
stands to reason that faculty diversity is more urgent and vital than stu-
dent diversity.
As a group in general, university faculty have been strongly suppor-
tive of affirmative action.34 Law schools in particular have put immense
pressure on themselves to diversify. Schools that fail to make progress
in diversifying their student bodies risk loss of accreditation from the
American Bar Association and the American Association of Law
Schools. 35 In Grutter, ninety-one colleges and universities filed briefs in
support of the University of Michigan; not one college or university filed
a brief opposing affirmative action.36 A recent survey of 500 law school
faculty members found that an overwhelming majority supported efforts
to achieve diversity in the classroom.37 Not only have law school faculty
been outspoken advocates for affirmative action in academia, but they
have argued for its implementation elsewhere.38
33. "And, for law schools especially, racial and cultural diversity is crucial in order to prepare
students to be effective and responsible lawyers, academics and judges in an increasingly multi-
racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural world." Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. at 3, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
34. Robert Atwell, president of the American Council on Education, has characterized the
legal arguments against racial preferences as "bogus." Elizabeth Shogren, In U.S. Reversal, Minor-
ity-Based Scholarships OK, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1994, at Al. In general, "there is an abundance of
commentary by educators on the pedagogical value of attaining a racially diverse student body."
Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling
Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 411 (1998). See also Richard A. White, Law School
Faculty Views on Diversity In the Classroom and the Law School Community, (May, 2000), at
http://www.aals.org/statistics/diverse3.pdf (discussing widespread law faculty support for diversity
in the classroom).
35. Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 759, 795 (1995).
36. Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 368 (2003) (ex-
plaining that the briefs argued that "pluralistic, widely representative colleges provide a more enrich-
ing learning environment and better preparation for life in a multicultural world"). See also Suzanne
E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universities Go From Gratz and Grut-
ter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 48 (2004) (describing the amici briefs filed by universities in support of
the University of Michigan's race-based admissions policy as arguing that "diversity is essential for
the interplay of ideas in a nation that is becoming increasingly diverse").
37. See Eckes, supra note 36, at 49. Prominent law faculty members have argued that stu-
dents benefit in an ethnically diverse classroom. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of the
Affirmative Action Debate, 22 OHIO N.U. L REV. 1159, 1159-60 (1996). Psychology professors
have also argued that students learn better in a diverse educational environment. See Eckes, supra
note 36, at 50. The presidents of sixty-two major research universities have publicly defended the
use of race in admissions decisions. See Association of American Universities, On the Importance
of Diversity in University Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A27.
38. See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1071 (1989) (arguing that legal scholars "must continue to
20041
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In espousing the value of diversity in higher education,39 legal
scholars have argued that any hope in making racial progress lies "in the
unique ability of colleges and universities to bring together persons of all
racial backgrounds to achieve the educational benefits of diversity and,
ultimately, to create a more just, racially integrated society. ' '40  This call
for diversity in higher education includes and recognizes the need for
faculty diversity.4' Indeed, a diverse faculty is even more important than
a diverse student body, in terms of producing enlightening classroom
experiences.4 2 As one minority law student reports, "women and minori-
ties can feel silenced" by white male professors.43
Faculty diversity appears to be a necessary condition to student di-
versity. Minority students may not enroll at an institution that does not
have sufficient minority faculty; and even if they do enroll, they may
find themselves alienated and eventually drop out or transfer.44 More-
work for greater diversity at home on university faculties" and to "defend affirmative action from
attack in other institutions as well").
39. See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1610, 1615-16 (2003). See also Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitu-
tion: From Bakke to Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219, 235 (2003-2004) (arguing that if "racial minorities are
truly to be full and equal participants in all important areas of American life, this should include
minority representation in substantial numbers at the elite universities and at their law schools and
medical schools as well"). Law faculty also report that students value and welcome diversity. In
one survey, nearly fifty percent of the law students said that diverse classes offer "more scrious
discussions of alternative perspectives than homogeneous classes." Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and
Its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 2266 (2000).
Numerous published studies argue that diversity serves the educational mission of the nation's law
schools. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & DEAN WHITLA, DIVERSITY AND LEGAL EDUCATION: STUDENT
EXPERIENCES IN LEADING LAW SCHOOLS 4-6, 15 (1999); Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value
in American Higher Education?, 52 FLA. L. REv. 861, 865 (2000).
40. Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU at 2, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
41. Diversity, in this sense, means racial diversity. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1882 (1996) (stating that because "a professor's experiences, outlooks, and
ideas do correlate in some measure with his or her race, an unbiased decisionmaker could conclude
that race can sometimes be a reasonable proxy for intellectual diversity").
42. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855,
864 (1995) ("It is largely the faculty who set an institution's tone and agenda").
43. Moran, supra note 39, at 2282 (reporting that opinions expressed in a student survey
included one student's statement that "most professors are White males, so White males feel more
comfortable participating" in the classroom). In general, students say that "the professor play[s] a
significant role in setting the tone for discussion" in the classroom. Id at 2287.
44. See Abigail Therstrom, Voting Rights: Another Affirmative Action Mess, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 2031, 2048 (1996) (citing the argument for the need of minority faculty to connect with and
serve as a positive influence to minority students). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for
Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1080 (1991) (arguing that white teachers, unaware
of race and cultural differences, can unwittingly disadvantage black students by asking questions in
ways that conform to white middle-class customs). According to supporters, affirmative action is
needed not only to give students authority figures with whom they can connect, but also to eliminate
"black invisibility" by demanding that whites see "blacks in positions of power, authority, and
responsibility-as teachers .. .." Id. at 1109. Various surveys have concluded that minority stu-
dents can feel discrimination from and have very little interaction with white faculty. See, e.g.,
Sylvia Hurtado, Graduate School Racial Climates and Academic Self-Concept Among Minority
Graduate Students in the 1970's, 102 AM. J. EDUC. 330 (1994); Sylvia Hurtado & Deborah Faye
Carter, Effects of College Transition and Perceptions of the Campus Racial Climate on Latino Col-
lege Students' Sense of Belonging, 70 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 324, 325-38 (1997).
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over, there is an argument that the absence of minority faculty "lessens
the probability that minority students will complete graduate and profes-
sional programs at the same rate as white students." 45 A research study
asserts that the best predictor of graduation rates of African-American
graduate and professional students is the presence of minority faculty
members.46 Schools that had African-American faculty members were
found to have graduated more African-American students.47 Therefore,
by implication, if an institution does not have a critical mass of minority
faculty, it may not be able to attract and keep a critical mass of minority
students.48
The chain of argument goes as follows: to achieve student diversity,
a diverse faculty must be present; and to achieve a diverse faculty, af-
firmative action programs must be implemented. Without such pro-
grams, minority faculty members and candidates face unfair and prejudi-
cial barriers; and if they have not graduated from prestigious schools,
minority candidates may not be able to compete with those candidates
who have.49  According to academic supporters of affirmative action,
minority scholars often face discrimination regarding their fields of re-
search.50 Furthermore, because they are less likely than their white col-
45. Edgar G. Epps, Affirmative Action and Minority Access to Faculty Positions, '9 OHIO ST.
L.J., 755, 759 (1998).
46. See JAMES E. BLACKWELL, MAINSTREAMING OUTSIDERS: THE PRODUCTION OF BLACK
PROFESSIONALS 64 (Philip Eisen ed., General Hall, Inc.1981).
47. See id. at 70.
48. See Epps, supra note 45, at 759-60. Furthermore, the "research suggests that the presence
or absence of minority faculty members in graduate and professional schools is a relatively good
informal indicator of an institution's commitment to the goal of equal opportunity for minorities in
higher education." Id. at 759. Professors Brest and Oshige argue that minority faculty "tends to
make minority students feel that they are welcomed at the institution." Brest & Oshige, supra note
42 at 865. Minority faculty often provide "counsel, support, and comfort for minority students." Id.
"[T]he presence of minority faculty lends reality to the possibility of academic careers for minority
students." Id. Moreover, minority faculty have a beneficial effect on white students who may never
before have "encountered members of minority groups in positions of authority." Id.
49. See Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado
Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 361-362 (1989).
50. See Aleinikoff, supra note 44 at 1085 (arguing that "scholarship done by minority schol-
ars on minority issues is frequently greeted with skepticism from majority members of the acad-
emy."). According to Professor Aleinikoff, race-consciousness is "an entrenched structure of
thought," even among faculty members, that can lead people "to interpret situations and actions
differently when the race of the actors varies." Id. at 1067. "The stories that African-Americans tell
about America-stories of racism and exclusion, brutality and mendacity-simply do not ring true to
the white mind." Id. at 1069. To ask whites to give credibility to these stories would be "to ask
whites to give up too much of what they 'know' about the world." Id. Moreover, "[w]hite percep-
tions of black inferiority cannot be overcome by repressing our implicit recognition of race," but
"only when whites see blacks as equals." Id. at 1108 (emphasis added). It is argued that what quali-
fies as acceptable research topics is largely defined by the values and experiences of the majority
racial group. "Faculty of color voice a common concem that their work is undervalued and that they
are treated differently in the academy than their peers." Epps, supra note 45, at 769 (quoting Caro-
line Sotello Viernes Turner & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Faculty Diversity and Affirmative Action, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE: STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION
132 (Mildred Garcia ed., State University of New York Press 1997)). In the humanities, for in-
stance, a minority scholar may have to spend an inordinate amount of time "justifying the inclusion
of African-American literature, art, or music in the curriculum." Id. Consequently, as Professor
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leagues to be tenured, "they are more vulnerable to threats, open or un-
spoken." 51 Minority faculty also can find themselves deluged with ad-
ministrative and academic advising duties. Apparently, since there are
relatively few minority faculty members, the few that are on staff end up
advising and counseling the majority of minority and female students.52
Moreover, minority faculty are said to be "overburdened with committee
responsibilities," since the university wants to staff as many committees
as possible with the few minority faculty members available.5 3
Given these arguments, affirmative action policies aimed at faculty
composition are essential, because if a diverse faculty does not exist,
then the educational benefits of diversity in which the state has a compel-
ling interest cannot occur. But there is a substantial obstacle to faculty
diversity, an obstacle much greater than those facing the achievement of
student diversity. That obstacle is the tenure system.
In Grutter, the Court recognized that since a "core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race," any race-conscious admissions policy
must be limited in duration.54 The Court accepted the Law School's as-
sertion that it would "terminate its race-conscious admissions program as
soon as practicable."'55  However, by limiting the time duration of these
affirmative action admissions policies, the Court has imposed a degree of
urgency on the matter.56 Indeed, by even accepting a race-based admis-
sions policy, the Court recognized that the country cannot wait for un-
regulated social conditions to produce the desired diversity, but rather
that racial diversity in the nation's institutions of higher education must
Epps argues, "the minority scholar is constrained by the culture of the major research university to
select research paradigms, research topics, and publication outlets that conform to the traditions of
institutions that have historically excluded minorities." Id.
51. Chen, supra note 41, at 1887. Minority scholars contend that institutions must look be-
yond the traditional measurements of academic achievement or potential when evaluating minority
candidates for faculty positions. See Amado M. Padilla, Ethnic Minority Scholars, Research, and
Mentoring: Current and Future Issues, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May, 1994, at 24-27.
52. See Epps, supra note 45, at 767 (claiming that minority faculty end up becoming "mentors
to many more students than is typical for university faculty"). Because "students looking for suppor-
tive role models seek out the limited number of minority (and women) professors for advice and
moral support," minority (and women) faculty members find themselves swamped with "writing
letters of recommendation and helping with graduate or professional school selection, job and fel-
lowship applications, and post-doctoral research opportunities." Id.
53. Id.
54. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 341. According to the Court, the requirement that all
race-conscious admissions policies have a termination point "assure[s] all citizens that the deviation
from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure
taken in the service of the goal of equality itself." Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).
55. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. As Justice O'Connor stated, "[w]e expect that 25 years from
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come rapidly.57 Therefore, because the tenure system operates as a huge
brake on any significant and immediate progress regarding the compel-
ling interest of diversity, it should likewise suffer the same fate as ra-
cially-homogenous student bodies.
At many law schools, more than eighty to ninety percent of the full-
time, tenure-track faculty are in fact tenured.58  This huge overhead of
permanently employed faculty members means that only a small fraction
of faculty positions open up each year, and it is out of this small number
that law schools are attempting to achieve faculty diversity.
59 Quite
commonly, at the vast majority of the Nation's law schools, during a
student's enrollment not one faculty position will turn over. Conse-
quently, despite the school's professed commitment to diversity and af-
firmative action among the faculty, absolutely nothing will be done. And
because the faculty lags in its diversity, the student body will most
probably lag in its diversity, despite all the meticulously drafted race-
conscious admissions policies.
IV. THE DIVERSITY ARGUMENT FOR TENURE TERMINATION
Tenure termination may impose some significant effects on a se-
lected group of people. 60 However, these effects are justified, perhaps
even mandated, by the very arguments accepted by the Court in Grutter.
The quest for diversity of employee personnel would not justify a
business corporation firing all its non-minority employees.
61 Yet as
57. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHiO ST. L.J.
669, 682 (1998) (arguing that "[a]ffirmative action grows out of the frustration with the apparent
intractability of this country's inability to achieve [racial equality]"); Chen, supra note 41 at 1849
(stating that "[dieliverance [from the need of affirmative action] cannot come soon enough").
58. The University of Dayton Law School, for instance, reports that 85 percent of its faculty
are tenured. See http://www.udayton.edul-vpadmin/fbookfileslhr/faIlO31tenurefac pdf (n.d.). At St.
Mary's Law School, 91 percent are tenured. See Gloria Padilla, Decision to Deny Tenure Sparks
Protest at St. Mary's, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS, April 7, 1999, at lB.
59. The tenure system "diminishes an institution's opportunity to recruit and retain a younger
and more diverse faculty." James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Em-
ployment Relationship Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159, 170 (2000). In over 300 years,
for instance, Harvard University has never fired a tenured professor. Id. at 173.
As argued in the amicus brief of several deans of prominent national law schools, univer-
sity education for most students "typically occurs early in life and then ends." Brief of Amici Curiae
Judith Areen et al. at 9, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). Therefore, in the case of law
school students, their academic legal training is limited to three years. Given the arguments for
diversity made in Grutter, it is all the more vital that these law students experience a "diversity"
legal education as soon as possible. For the rest of their lives, they will be active in business and
professional groups and enterprises, but they have only three years in which to avail themselves of
all the educational benefits of diversity. This alone should make the need for immediate and com-
plete faculty diversity all the more acute.
60. Some degree of economic hardship is inevitable in any affirmative action program. See
infra notes 97-110. In desegregation programs, for instance, some students have to endure bussing
over long distances in order to achieve school diversity. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Ed., 362 F. Supp. 1223, 1232 (D.C.N.C., 1973) (acknowledging that the desegregation plan will
require many children to be "bussed out of their home neighborhoods, often for long distances").
61. Since Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion focuses on the educational benefits conferred
by diversity, and on the need for these benefits to prepare the future leaders of tomorrow, her case
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Grutter recognized, higher education is unique. It is a special institution
in the social, political and economic life of the nation.62 Consequently, if
only diversity can produce the necessary educational benefits described
by the Court, and if the educational system is vital for the sustenance of
democracy, then education is an area in which extraordinary measures
must be taken to achieve that diversity.
As the Court stated in Grutter, the strict scrutiny test requires that
any governmental racial discrimination meet two requirements: first, it
must serve a compelling state interest; and second, it must be narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. 63 Thus, any race-based distinction must be
the most narrowly drawn distinction possible.64 Given this constitutional
command, it can be argued that the path toward educational diversity
does not wind through the larger and ill-defined pool of potential stu-
dents, but through the specific and existing faculty staffs of the law
schools. Since student diversity is largely dependent on faculty diversity,
then the way to achieve the former is to focus narrowly on the latter.
Another reason why tenure should be abolished as a means of
achieving more rapid faculty diversity is that the persons who will be
most impacted are the persons who in American society most eagerly
advocate on behalf of diversity and affirmative action.65 If there is any
fundamental tenet of a democratic society, it is that those adversely af-
fected by a decision should have some say in or agreement with that de-
for affirmative action would not apply to private businesses. See also Rebecca Hanner White, Af-
firmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 Ky. L.J. 263, 263-64 (2003-
2004) (asserting that Grutter "does not directly apply to the affirmative use of race or other protected
characteristics in the workplace," and that the Court "was careful to limit its discussion to the ques-
tion" of whether diversity was a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions policies).
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (stating that "[wie have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding
importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 'sus-
taining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of soci-
ety") quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). See also Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that education "is the very foundation of good citizenship").
63. As the Grutter opinion stated: "[e]ven in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state interest, government is still 'constrained in
how it may pursue that end: [Tihe means chosen to accomplish the [govemment's] asserted purpose
must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose."' Gruner, 539 U.S. at 331
(quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515
U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (stating that all governmental racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny).
64. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
65. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. Many academics argue that color blind-
ness is a futile delusion because of the past and present race discrimination in America. See, e.g.,
Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Nov. 1993, at 128, 130. Others argue that affirmative action is indispensable to alleviate the stigma
and prejudice facing minorities in America. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
295-302 (Harvard Univ. Press 1985); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1331 (1987).
Affirmative action programs at the university level even extend to shaping how scientists
conduct their research. For instance, federal law requires that federally-funded research involve
women and minorities both as researchers and as subjects of research in clinical studies. See Sally
L. Satel, Science by Quota, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1995, at 14.
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cision. And it certainly cannot be argued that the majority of law school
66
faculty do not agree with the need or wisdom of affirmative action.
Many legal scholars claim that race-conscious admissions policies
are needed in universities to remedy the blatant racism practiced by those
institutions in the past.67 The courts have long held that affirmative ac-
tion policies are warranted when governmental agencies--e.g., public
universities-have engaged in past racial discrimination. 68 In such cases,
diversity as a compelling interest is not even needed to justify the race-
conscious remedial actions.6 9 Consequently, on the basis of remedying
66. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, YALE L. & POL'Y
REV., 1, 9 (2002) (stating that the educational system, like no other domain, "practices and supports
[affirmative action] so enthusiastically"). According to a former chancellor at the University of
California at Berkeley, a university without affirmative action is akin to educational apartheid,
"almost as pervasive and insidious as the strictest segregation in South Africa." Chang-Lin Tien,
Diversity and Excellence in Higher Education, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE AcTION, 237, 239 (Nico-
laus Mills ed., Delta 1994). Other scholars argue that affirmative action in higher education is "the
best long-term remedy for the private beliefs and behavior that perpetuate the effects of racial caste."
Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1779 (1996). It has been re-
ported that "virtually all competitive law schools" operate "a quota system." Michael S. Greve, The
Newest Move in Law Schools' Quota Game, WALL ST. J., October 5, 1992, at A12. A former dean
of the University of California at Berkeley Boalt Hall Law School has publicly admitted to huge
discrepancies in the academic qualifications between blacks and other students. Id.
67. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Judith Areen et al. at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (stating that "today the Law School argues it would have 'too many' whites
if it could not discriminate in its admission process").
68. For instance, to remedy the injuries caused by past discrimination, the courts can impose
an affirmative hiring and promotional remedy, which prevails until a designated percentage of mi-
nority workers has been reached. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (holding
that "the effects of past discrimination in the Department 'will not wither away of their own accord'
and that 'without promotional quotas the continuing effects of this discrimination cannot be elimi-
nated.' (quoting the District Court in Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 75 (M.D.Ala. 1983);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding the police department's
mandatory hiring quotas to correct past discrimination); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that police department quota relief was necessary to eliminate unconstitutional past
hiring policies).
Courts may also order such remedies against labor unions which have engaged in past
racial discrimination. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l. Ass'n. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (upholding remedies, including preferential affirmative action hiring and the imposition of
substantial fines, to remedy the effects of pervasive past discrimination). In fact, until Grutter, the
constitutional justification of affirmative action was primarily limited to serving as a remedy for past
discrimination. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 214-20 (recounting the history of Supreme
Court decisions on racial discrimination).
As noted earlier in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit ruled that diversity did not constitute a
compelling government interest and suggested that perhaps the only governmental interest compel-
ling enough to justify a race-based admissions policy was to remedy the present effects of prior
discrimination by that particular governmental body. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-46. Consequently,
prior to Grutter, the only constitutionally compelling interest recognized by the Court that satisfied
the strict scrutiny test was the remediation of the effects of past race discrinmination. See Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (holding "modem equal protection doctrine has
recognized only one such [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination").
69. The Court has endorsed the attempts by institutions who voluntarily try to achieve more
racial equality, even when there is no direct evidence of previous discriminatory behavior. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1987) (ruling that an employer need not prove its
own past discriminatory acts so as to justify its adoption of an affirmative action program, only that
the employer demonstrate discrepancies in certain segregated job categories).
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past discrimination alone, substantial affirmative action mandates can be
imposed-substantial enough to justify the dismantling of tenure.
There is no shortage of statements, testimony, and research by legal
scholars regarding the racial discrimination that has existed, and that
continues to exist, in the nation's institutions of higher education.
70
These scholars assert that even today, unequivocal symptoms exist "indi-
cating that racial equality has not yet found its way to many institutions
of higher education," and that there is "ample evidence that there exists
some form of discrimination" even at some of the nation's elite law
schools.7 1 In both Hopwood cases, federal investigators claimed to have
found pervasive and egregious discrimination in the recent past of
Texas's higher education system.72 As a University of Texas law profes-
sor who also served as counsel for the University in the Hopwood cases
writes: "[W]e were able to persuade the trial court that the vestiges of
discrimination were not merely the lore of a bygone era.,
73
Legal scholars point to the disparity between the percentage of mi-
nority students in higher education and the percentage of full-time minor-
70. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 1618 (recalling being told that approximately forty years
ago, at a time when some of today's senior legal faculty were obtaining or applying for tenure, the
University of Michigan "accepted only one black applicant each year"); Thomas Ross, Innocence
and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 312 (1990) (describing the burden on blacks of
persistent, unconscious racism). Even on racially integrated faculties, Ross argues, a black law
professor "must overcome widespread assumptions of inferiority held by students and colleagues,
while white colleagues enjoy the benefit of the positive presumption and of the contrast with their
black colleague." Id. See also Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of
Color in Still White Law Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986).
See, e.g., Yollander Hardaway, Affirmative Action: Does the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood
Ruling Place Affirmative Action on Shaky Ground?, 122 EDUC. L. REP. 1089, 1101 (1998) (stating
that "recent studies concerning minorities and higher education reveal present vestiges of past dis-
crimination"); Charles R. Lawrence M, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987) (arguing that racism is an illness that "in-
fects almost everyone"); Darryl Brown, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L.
REV. 295, 322 (1990) (discussing the "daily repetition of subtle racism and subordination in the
classroom and on campus").
Also, Professor Aleinikoff states that racism in America is "widespread, deeply ingrained,
passed from generation to generation." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The
Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 352 (1992). "It is becoming increas-
ingly clear.., that the academic world that many students of color experience... [is one] in which
minority students feel as if they are outsiders-too often the victims of stereotypical (and essential-
ist) assumptions and, with increasing frequency, outright racist behavior." ld. at 367. "The increase
in overt acts of racism on college campuses in recent years is well documented," with professors
"often send[ing] similar messages" of racism. Id. As Professor Aleinikoff argues, what needs to be
changed is "the institutional culture" of universities-a culture that is "overwhelmingly white," in
which access "to power hierarchies is generally limited to whites." Id. at 369-70.
71. Kent Kostka, Higher Education, Hopwood, and Homogeneity: Preserving Affirmative
Action and Diversity in a Scrutinizing Society, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 265, 279-80 (1996).
72. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555-56 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd by 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996).
73. Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 681 (expressing also his deep skepticism about even those
universities that have implemented affirmative action programs). He argues that "it is highly
unlikely in this day and age that the institutions of higher education that have heavily internalized a
commitment to affirmative action are at the same time remedying their own discrimination." Id.
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ity faculty as evidence of continuing discrimination.74 Others accuse
universities and law schools of subtly reinforcing racial stereotypes
through their use of discriminatory testing and admissions standards.75
Implicit within these accusations is the larger criticism that racial dis-
crimination is deeply ingrained in America's current system of higher
education.76  As Critical Race Theory proclaims, the standards used to
measure achievement in higher education are a "gate built by a white
male hegemony that requires a password in the white man's voice for
passage."
77
The faculty of the nation's higher education institutions have been
the most vociferous critics of the nation's racial practices and attitudes.
78
They fault society, including institutions of higher education, for not
admitting to this racism and to the need for affirmative action.79  They
further argue that minorities are oppressed not just by individual racist
attitudes, but also "and more importantly by intractable hierarchical and
institutional structures that a more passive, slow-moving non-
74. See Epps, supra note 45, at 761. The percentage of minorities in the full-time faculty
ranks of higher education is approximately half of the percentage of minorities in the student ranks.
Id. The persistence of discrimination in higher education can be seen from the fact that "minorities
are still tremendously underrepresented in undergraduate and graduate programs nationwide, includ-
ing law." Kostka, supra note 71, at 281. "Socialized biases that extend far beyond formal admission
barriers cannot be quantified or eliminated by merely opening up the doors to disadvantaged racial
minorities; there still exists a pervasive discriminatory atmosphere in society that disadvantages
many, and thus, justifies race-based remedies." Id.
75. See Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 426. Professor Rubenfeld argues that just as segregating
schools was held unconstitutional in Brown, so too should "reliance on the SAT, the LSAT, and all
the other standardized tests" that unfairly convey the message that minorities cannot compete be
found unconstitutional. Id. The use by law schools of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) has
been strongly criticized by supporters of affirmative action. The "substantial disparate effect" that
the [SAT has on minorities "has been well-documented." Brief of Amici Curiae Society of Amei-
can Law Teachers at 16, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
The SAT, it is argued, reflects the country's "legacy of racial injustice." K. ANTHONY
APPIAH & AMY GtJTMANN, COLOR CoNscIous: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 125 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1996). The racial discrimination of the SATs are demonstrated by the fact that "when
average SAT scores are broken down by class and race, we also see enormous gaps between black
and white students within the same income groups." Id. at 140.
76. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, (1991).
77. Id. at 2052. For a description of Critical Race Theory, see Tanya Kateri Hemandez,
Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Transnational Critical Race Theory Approach, 63 LA. L.
REV. 875, 877 (2003) (arguing that "Critical Race Theory is a strain of legal scholarship that chal-
lenges the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented in legal culture and,
more generally, in society as a whole"). See also John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration
Warrior-Part 2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic "Truth" of Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, 83 MINN L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1999) (stating that "Critical race theory primarily investigates
how the law contributes to and diminishes racial subordination").
78. See, e.g., supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. These sweeping criticisms are re-
flected in the arguments put forth by respondents in Grutter. "The inescapable conclusion is that
this is not a 'color blind' society," but one that is "a socially-constructed racial hierarchy with whites
firmly on top." Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU
at 22, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). "[R]acial discrimination persists across all class
levels and affects even those African Americans with advanced skills and credentials." Id. at 19.
79. See Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 733 (1999)
(stating that it is rarer still that a university "defending a plan [for affirmative action] will be willing
to assert its own past discrimination as justification for affirmative measures").
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discrimination principle cannot effectively dislodge."80  Yet despite this
comprehensive criticism of the many ways in which higher education
discriminates against minorities, faculty members rarely address the
problematic tenure system.
The tenure system most likely qualifies as one of those intractable
hierarchical and institutional structures that sustains the racial discrimi-
nation of the past. Academic tenure was born in a racist age, and if the
remnants of discrimination exist everywhere else in society they cer-
tainly must in the tenure system.81 Many currently tenured faculty were
awarded tenure at a time when, by the very admissions of faculty mem-
bers, women and minorities were being shut out. Consequently, it seems
logical that tenure as an institutional structure rooted in a past of oppres-
sive racism should suffer the same fate that other remnants of racism
have experienced. To the degree that tenure has placed white males into
positions of power and privilege-and, given the overwhelming numbers
of white male tenured professors, it apparently has-then that instrument
of racial privilege should be dismantled. Only then will women and mi-
norities, who have previously been excluded from those positions, finally
assume their rightful and long-neglected place.82
V. BREAKING DOwN THE TENURE BARRIER TO DIVERSITY
In a way, the academic community has enjoyed a free ride on the
racial-virtue train. Faculty members have been eager advocates of af-
firmative action and, yet, because of tenure they have had to incur no
costs or burdens in the social crusade for diversity. Moreover, by adopt-
ing the diversity argument, academia has been able to shift focus away
from the more backward-looking remedial rationale for affirmative ac-
tion. This is because the diversity argument incorporates a "future-
oriented vision,, 83 and, thus, "ascribes no guilt, calls for no arguments
about compensation. '"84 So, by supporting affirmative action policies
aimed at students and new faculty hires, white male faculty members can
80. Schuck, supra note 66, at 28.
81. The beginnings of tenure in the U.S. higher education system dates back to 1900. See
Fishman, supra note 59, at 165.
82. Institutions of higher education "continue to perpetuate racial disadvantage," Brief of
Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241). And for "far too long, the doors to those positions [within higher educa-
tion] have been shut to Negroes." Id. at 26.
The Supreme Court has endorsed a narrow version of what could be construed as a restitu-
tion argument, permitting affirmative action where identifiable past discrimination has been proved,
when this discrimination continues to affect individual victims, and when the racial preference is
narrowly tailored to remedy this particular discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 777 (1976) (allowing affirmative action to dismantle a seniority status promotion system to
remedy prior discrimination); see, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,448-49 (1980) (holding
affirmative action in federally funded public construction projects constitutional).
83. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Di-
versity," 1993 Wisc. L. REv. 105, 107 (1993).
84. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV.
2059, 2060 (1996).
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ease whatever guilt or discomfort they might feel on racial issues, while
at the same time incurring no risk of being forced to suffer any profes-
sional or economic hardship themselves.
85
Surveys have shown that university faculty tend to be "ideologically
and politically far more liberal, Democratic, statist, and secular than
other Americans. ' '86  But their insulation from any adverse effects of
affirmative action programs casts a certain suspicion on the arguments of
faculty members in support of such programs. They are seen as safely
immune from the burdens or consequences of their beliefs. Indeed, most
of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions have involved not
the professional or intellectual classes, but occupations such as police
officers and firefighters. 87  The bulk of the judicial affirmative action
docket has been directed at, as the Court once described it, "the work of
the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional ... or,
indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain. 88
Of course, imposing an affirmative action program that does away
with faculty tenure would indeed place some significant burdens on cur-
rently tenured faculty. However, such a program may be the only way a
university or law school can effectively and immediately achieve the
educational benefits of diversity, which constituted the compelling state
interest under Grutter.89 If a public university, pursuing the compelling
interest of diversity, focused on its faculty make-up and disbanded the
tenure system as a means of achieving diversity, it would be exercising
85. Most university professors "are profoundly uncomfortable at the thought of teaching a
class or being on a faculty containing only whites and Asians." Schuck, supra note 66, at 36 (adding
that "tenured professors have little or nothing to fear personally from affirmative action for students
or faculty"). Affirmative action, in fact, benefits tenured faculty "by eliminating the discomfort they
would feel in classes and faculty meetings without non-Asian minorities, and they bear few of the
program's costs." Id.
86. Id. See also Rachel Zabarkes Friedman, Waking Up, NAT'L REVIEW, October 13, 2003, at
44 (describing student dissatisfaction with "the radical left-wing views of their professors").
87. See generally Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing firefighters to challenge
prior consent decrees); see generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 150 (1987) (upholding
50 percent promotion requirement for black state troopers under the Equal Protection Clause); Local
No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (discrimination suit brought by
minority firefighters); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (addressing
a fire department's suit over racially biased hiring, promotion, and lay-off practices).
88. Rector, etc. of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
89. The termination of tenure, for the sake of achieving diversity, could be achieved in two
ways. The first, and the one most consistent with the Grutter reasoning, would be if the public
academic institution itself implemented change. In this way, it could rely upon the academic free-
dom and educational autonomy justification relied on by Justice O'Connor. The second way, how-
ever, would be for the state to abolish tenure. It could do so in the name of the compelling state
interest of diversity, which in turn produces educational benefits, which in turn produces better and
more enlightened social leaders of the future. Arguably, according to Grutter, the state has as com-
pelling an interest in diversity as does the Law School. After all, the benefits of diversity extend far
beyond the boundaries of the academic community. They include the development of good democ-
ratic citizens, the nurturing of enlightened social and political leaders, and the promotion of racial
harmony in society, through the strengthening of trust in minorities that social institutions are open
to them. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29 (deferring to law schools' judgment on issues of student
admission and diversity).
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just the kind of academic freedom cited by Justice O'Connor as one of
the reasons for upholding the race-based admissions policy in Grutter.9°
Granted, the now untenured faculty members would feel some loss of
economic and professional security, but they would all be eligible to re-
apply for a faculty position under the new affirmative action policy.
Moreover, mere economic loss or professional insecurity cannot be a
barrier to an interest as compelling as diversity.
Even outside the higher education arena, where diversity is not such
a compelling interest, affirmative action programs impose financial and
professional costs on nonfavored racial groups. For example, in the field
of public and private contracting, laws often impose "set-asides, quotas,
and other preferences for minority contractors." 91 Public housing pro-
jects are subject to affirmative action mandates; and private developers
receiving public funds are often required to implement set-asides or quo-
tas for minority groups.92 Each year, over 100 million dollars in race-
based financial aid is distributed by colleges and universities.93 In pro-
fessional schools alone, ten percent of all available scholarship money
goes exclusively to minority students.94 At Harvard University, all mi-
nority graduate students receive full tuition, room, and board irrespective
of their financial need.95 Obviously, when this money is given to certain
minority students, it is denied to nonninority students, thus causing them
to suffer a definite financial injury.
96
Courts have approved affirmative action programs that levy some
economic burdens on nonminority groups. In United States v. Para-
dise,97 the Court upheld a promotion scheme for the Alabama State
Troopers requiring that one African-American be promoted for every one
white promotion." In Fullilove v. Klutznick,99 the Court endorsed an
affirmative action program that mandated that a certain percentage of
government business be awarded to minorities.9 ° In Wittmer v. Pe-
ters,101 three white candidates who had applied for lieutenant positions in
an Illinois correctional boot camp, where nearly seventy percent of the
90. Id. at 328.
91. Schuck, supra note 66, at 9; see generally TAMAR JACOBY, SOMEONE ELSE'S HOUSE:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR INTEGRATION 9 (Free Press 1998) (attacking modem af-
firmative action practices).
92. Schuck, supra note 66, at 10.
93. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 789.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. "In an era of diminishing educational budgets, affirmative action quite literally takes the
form of preferential finance." Chen, supra note 41, at 1899.
97. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
98. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (holding that the "one-for-one promotion requirement was
narrowly tailored to serve its several purposes").
99. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
100. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (in which ten percent of federal construction funds went to
minority businesses, so long as the bids were competitively priced).
101. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 82:1
THE NEXT STEP IN DIVERSITY
inmates were black men, 10 2 sued when a black candidate was selected for
the position, even though he had ranked far below the white candidates
on an employment test. 10 3 Conceding that race was a factor in the hiring
process, the state defended its decision on the grounds of "penological
necessity."' 4 The state argued that a black lieutenant was needed be-
cause the black inmates "are believed unlikely to play the correctional
game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some
blacks in authority in the camp."' 05 Similarly, in the university setting,
the elimination of tenure can be justified on the basis of educational ne-
cessity.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,'0 6 the Court held that
private and governmental employers could adopt race-conscious em-
ployment policies designed to increase the employment of minorities in
jobs where they had been traditionally underrepresented.' 0 7 Also, in We-
ber,10 8 the Supreme Court approved of an employer's decision to reserve
fifty percent of the openings in a certain training program to black em-
ployees. 0 9 The training program and the reservation of fifty percent of
its openings to blacks, according to the Court, was an effort to "eliminate
traditional patterns of racial segregation."" 0
These cases establish some precedence for abolishing tenure. First,
because the ranks of tenured faculty in higher education have tradition-
ally been racially segregated,"l' very few blacks have held such posi-
tions. 12 Additionally, the economic costs incurred by faculty members
who have had their tenure status revoked may be no more than the eco-
nomic costs incurred by nonminority businesses or employees in the
above-referenced cases. Indeed, the detenured faculty members may
even retain their positions, since there would be no bar to their re-
applying. Moreover, given the special nature of education, as recognized
in Grutter, the achievement of diversity in the nation's universities
should justify greater costs than those tolerated in other areas of Ameri-
can life.
102. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 917.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 920.
106. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
107. Weber, 443 U.S. at 193.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 197-98.
110. Id. at 201.
111. See Brian Baskin, Top Universities Struggle to Hire Black Faculty, Study Shows, Brown
Daily Herald, at http://uwire.com/content/topnews03O5O200l.html (Mar. 3, 2002) (citing a study in
which, for instance, Brown University was ranked second out of the nation's 27 top schools with 4.1
percent of its tenured professors being black).
112. See generally, ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW SCHOOL
FACULTY AND CANDIDATES FOR LAW FACULTY PoSrrIONS (2002-03), available at
http://www.aals.org/statistics/2002-03/page2.html.
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In Grutter, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the strict scrutiny
standard did not preclude some judicial deference to the Law School's
judgment that diversity was essential to its educational mission. 113 Since
law schools are "the training ground for a large number of our Nation's
leaders,"' 14 and since in order "to cultivate a set of leaders with legiti-
macy in the eyes of the citizenry it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity," 5 the Court granted a kind of leeway that it has never before
granted. What Grutter did that Hopwood did not do was recognize the
incontrovertible nexus between higher education and society. 116 As sug-
gested in Grutter, higher education, more than any other profession, is
inextricably linked to the social fabric and political processes. 117
This societal importance of higher education means that the need
for diversity is more urgent and immediate than in any other segment of
society. Students devote only a few years to higher education, but spend
the rest of their lives in their professional, occupational and community
roles. Therefore, if students need diversity to become well-rounded citi-
zens and future leaders, then they need it very quickly. Indeed, as critics
have pointed out, a nondiverse education can be devastating on stu-
dents.' 18
Affirmative action programs in the past have often been defeated
because of the burden they place on the non-favored racial group. 19 But
this burden is different when it comes to tenured faculty in higher educa-
tion. By revoking their tenure, according to the implied arguments of
many scholars, the university is not unduly depriving faculty members of
a well-earned property interest as much as it is taking back a discrimina-
tory privilege set up during a period in our nation's past when minorities
and women were blatantly excluded. It is argued that the tenure stan-
dards and expectations which persist today incorporate the vestiges of
past discrimination. Therefore, just as it was wrong for the non-slave
113. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
114. Id. at 334.
115. Id.
116. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Hopwood, 78 F. 3d at 932.
117. As also implied by Grutter, although the link between government construction contracts
and societal discrimination may be ambiguous, higher education provides society with leadership
and a forum for the dissemination of ideas. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
118. Professor Epps states the scenario:
The voices of minority and women students may be silenced in different ways. For ex-
ample, when one speaks up in a class discussion, the professor and white males may lis-
ten politely and then continue the discussion as if no comment had been made; or the top-
ics of interest to minority and women students may be considered trivial or peripheral.
Exclusion may take the form of not including such students in study groups or coopera-
tive research projects. It may also take the form of denying teaching or research assis-
tantships to students who do not fit the mainstream ideal.
Epps, supra note 45, at 765.
119. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
120. See Epps, supra note 45, at 765. "Unless these types of structural barriers to success are
eliminated, it will be difficult to increase the representation of minority and women students in
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owning descendants of slave owners to claim innocence while living off
the inheritance provided by their ancestors, it is wrong for tenured white
male faculty today to advocate for affirmative action while enjoying an
academic position that has racist roots.
Legal scholars argue that all of America suffers from "unconscious
racism. '"121 If this is so, then all of America's institutional structures are
tainted with racism. Since tenure is one of the oldest and most powerful
structures in American higher education, then it too incorporates the dis-
criminatory effects of unconscious racism and should be abolished. 122 If
the academic arguments about racism in America are true, then the ten-
ured faculties in the nation's universities have been among society's big-
gest benefactors of that racism, since for decades white males have been
obtaining lifetime tenure positions at the expense of women and minori-
ties.
Even though tenured teachers have a "property interest in their ten-
ure,' ' 23 it is not an interest "created by the Constitution."' 124 Nor does it
rise to the level of a fundamental right protected under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.12 5 Consequently, the property interest of a tenured faculty
member falls lower on the ladder of constitutional rights than does the
equal protection interest of the white applicant in Grutter. Thus, if the
compelling interest of diversity justifies an infringement of an equal pro-
tection right, it certainly can support an infringement of a lower-priority
property interest. 126
Most tenure policies provide for termination in the event of extraor-
dinary instances of "institutional need." 127 Examples of such institutional
faculty positions. These practices represent a form of institutionalized elitism that makes it difficult
for minority and women graduate students to compete on an equal basis with white men." Id.
121. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 70, at 313 (discussing the ways in which white males are
benefited, to the disadvantage of minorities, by society's unconscious racism).
122. In Croson, the Court stated that the remedying of past discrimination was the only com-
pelling interest that could justify an affirmative action, set-aside program. City of Richmond v. J. S.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989). Racial inequality "has also provided unfair advantages to
whites as a group, who have disproportionately benefitted." Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and the ACLU at 23, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
Thus, there is the need to "dismantle the institutional protection of benefits for whites that have been
based on white supremacy and maintained at the expense of Blacks." Id. at 27. Indeed, the argu-
ment can be made that the tenure system at a public university represents a state-sponsored policy
sustaining the vestiges of racism.
123. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997) (holding that an employee's due process
rights had not been violated because due process could be satisfied by a prompt post-suspension
hearing).
124. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that a professor
does not have a protected interest in continued employment when he is merely a contract employee).
125. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (holding that the school
board's refusal to renew the teacher's contract did not constitute an equal protection deprivation).
126. The Constitution does not permit a university to "achieve diversity on the cheap." Sedler,
supra note 39, at 238.
127. See Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Faculty Dismissal Because of Enrollment Declines,
28 J. L.& EDUC. 193, 193 (1999). Such instances of institutional need include declining enrollments
and program downsizing. Id. at 207.
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need include financial emergencies brought on by declining enrollment
and severe budget cutbacks. 128 Sometimes, tenure termination is allowed
when programs or departments are reorganized. 129  Therefore, if budget
shortfalls and department reorganization are sufficient to justify a termi-
nation of tenure, then clearly the constitutionally compelling need for
diversity can also support such a termination.'
30
VI. CONCLUSION: THE QUEST FOR REAL DIVERSITY
The value of diversity to higher education rests on the same ration-
ale that Justice Holmes first used to justify the protection of unpopular
speech. 13  Only through a truly open marketplace of ideas can a democ-
ratic society acquire the truth and insights needed to govern itself.32
Likewise, the diversity that a university community needs is a market-
place-of-ideas diversity, a viewpoint diversity. This is the nature of the
diversity recognized by Grutter as a compelling state interest.
33
Higher education is devoted to intellectual development and learn-
ing. Consequently, the most valuable diversity is one of intellectual or
ideological diversity. Racial diversity is but a proxy for viewpoint diver-
sity.t34 It is a presumptive substitute, based on the theory that people of
128. The University of Illinois at Chicago tenure policy allows for tenure termination in the
event of "grave institutional financial stringency." Jemimah Noonoo, What is Tenure? CHICAGO
FLAME-NEWs, February 17, 2004, at http://www.chicagoflame.corn/globaluserelements
printpage.cfm?storyid=222483. Virginia Commonwealth University provides for dismissal of ten-
ured faculty upon a "[b]ona fide financial emergency in a department or school, or reorganization or
termination of programs as defined by established University policies and procedures." Procedure
for Termination of Employment of Tenured Faculty Members, at http://www.vcu.edu/ireweb/
policies/tenure.htm. According to the Southem Illinois University tenure policy, a tenured faculty
member's employment is subject to "generally applicable amendments to personnel policies of the
[university]." Tenure Policy and Guidelines, at http://www.siue.edu/PROVOSTIFHB/7-16-l.html.
129. See Seaquist, supra note 127, at 193 (stating that instances of institutional need justifying
tenure termination include declining enrollments and program downsizing); See also Procedure for
Termination of Employment of Tenured Faculty Members, at http://www.vcu.edu/ireweb/
policiesttenure.htm.
130. There may be even more reasons to terminate faculty tenure. One prominent criticism is
that tenure solidifies and encourages incompetence. According to one study conducted over a three
year time period, almost fifty percent of all senior tenured law faculty did not publish anything. See
Michael 1. Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: Comparisons
of Law School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 373, 381 (1985).
131. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
majority's affirmation of a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of Congress).
132. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616.
133. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citing the benefits of diversity as being a "livelier, more spirited,
and simply more enlightening and interesting" classroom discussion. Id. (quoting Respondents'
Brief for Certiorari to the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Grutter v. Bollinger,
137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 02-241)).
134. Id. at 307 (stating that the "diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses
a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element"). Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). On the other hand, although the
University of Michigan Law School purported to consider other types of diversity such as unusual
employment experiences and extracurricular activities, race was the most identifiable diversity factor
that separates one applicant from another. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 827-28. But the argument is
that educators truly believe that viewpoint diversity strengthens education, they should pursue it
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different races have different viewpoints. However, the next step in
achieving real diversity is to go beyond using race as a proxy for view-
point diversity.
With the Grutter recognition of diversity as a compelling interest,
universities have now been put on notice. They have been told that the
nation's future depends on citizens and leaders educated in an academic
environment of diverse ideas. They have been empowered to aggres-
sively and creatively pursue this diversity. They have been informed that
the compelling interest of diversity can justify infringement of the most
fundamental of rights.
Countless scholars have stressed the urgent need for a diverse fac-
ulty that can in turn foster a diverse classroom experience and encourage
the development of a diverse student body.135  As these scholars have
argued, the ranks of America's higher education faculty are woefully
lacking in racial and gender diversity. 136 However, those are not the only
areas of diversity that are lacking. Religious diversity is almost nonexis-
tent among university faculty. Eugene Volokh states that "the lack of
religious diversity at many schools is at least as severe as the lack of ra-
cial diversity. '37 As noted in The Atlantic Monthly, "it's appalling that
evangelical Christians are practically absent from entire professions,
such as academia."'138 But if there is a compelling interest in discriminat-
ing on the basis of race so as to promote an educational atmosphere with
a supposedly more diverse set of student views, then surely it would be
proper and even necessary to discriminate among viewpoints so as to
achieve a balanced mix of opinions and beliefs in the faculty and student
body. Under the Grutter logic of diversity, faculty membership should
reflect all viewpoints, even those of religious conservatives.
In addition to a lack of religious diversity, university faculty are
also strikingly nondiverse in their political ideology. For instance, law
faculty tend to be seventy percent less likely to be Republican than the
public at large. 39 A study of several universities found that nearly 90
percent of liberal arts professors were Democrats. 14° Thus, if universities
directly rather than using race as a proxy. Id. at 849-50 (explaining that viewpoint diversity may be
equally attainable by non-minority students).
135. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. See also White, supra note 34.
136. See Baskin, supra note 111.
137. Volokh, supra note 84, at 2072. Professor Volokh estimates that law school faculty are
approximately 75 percent less likely to attend religious services than the public at large. Id. at 2072.
138. David Brooks, People Like Us, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, September, 2003, at 32.
139. Volokh, supra note 84, at 2073 n. 23.
140. Brooks, supra note 138, at 32. Of the forty-two professors in the English, history, sociol-
ogy, and political-science departments at Brown University, all were Democrats. Id. In his dissent
in Grutter, Justice Kennedy recounted the testimony of one law school dean who described a faculty
debate whether Cubans should be counted as Hispanics: "[o]ne professor objected on the grounds
that Cubans were Republicans." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A study of
various university faculties showed that at Cornell the ratio of liberal to conservative faculty mem-
bers was 166 to 6, at Stanford it was 151 to 17, at UCLA it was 141 to 9, and at the University of
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can discriminate on the basis of race to achieve diversity, they should be
able to discriminate on the all-important basis of political ideology. If
they require themselves to screen faculty candidates for racial and gender
diversity, they should surely be required to screen for viewpoint diver-
sity. In pursuit of the cause of diversity, and extending the logic of Grut-
ter, perhaps the content of libraries or the content of law review articles
should be monitored or regulated so as to achieve the proper balancing of
viewpoints. Certainly the types of books available in a school library
have a significant effect on the educational environment of the school, as
well as on the liveliness and nature of discussion in the classroom.
Colorado it was 116 to 5. Jeff Jacoby, "Intellectual Diversity," Townhall.com, December 5, 2004 at
www.townhall.comlcolumnists/jeffjacoby/printjj2004l204.shtml. A poll of Ivy League professors
had liberals outnumbering conservatives by more than ten to one. Id. And in a survey of more than
1700 social science professors, a Santa Clara University researcher found that between 80 and 90
percent identify as 'liberals' and vote Democratic. David Horowitz, "It's Time for Fairness and
Inclusion in Our Universities," FrontpageMagazine.com, December 14, 2004, at
www.frontpagemag.com/articles/printable.asp?ID=-16301. The same study showed that among
junior faculty at Stanford and Berkeley, the ratio of liberals to conservatives was 30 to 1. Id
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